Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society
THE BUSHIRE-SHIRAZ ROAD, 1918-19
BY MAJOR-GENERAL J. A. DOUGLAS, C.M.G., C.I.E.
جنبش آزادی بخش ابوشهر
you can download the document in English or Farsi from the below link:
A MEETING of the Central Asian
Society was held at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall,
S.W., on Thursday, February 8, 1923. An address was given by
Major-General J. A. Douglas, C.M.G., C.I.E., on «The Operations on the
Bushire-Shiraz Road, 1918-19.» General Sir Edmund Barrow presided.
The CHAIRMAN:
Ladies and Gentlemen,—The
lecture this evening is on » The Operations on the Bushire-Shiraz Road,»
the well-known road that leads up into the heart of Persia; and the
lecturer I need hardly introduce to most of you, as I expect all those
who have served in the East are well acquainted with the name, at all
events, of General Douglas, who commanded on that line during the
operations. I will now ask you to give your attention to a lecture
which, I am sure, will be both interesting and instructive. (Applause.)
THE LECTURE:
Persia during the War was the
scene of military operations in four different parts of the country.
General Dunsterville has already described before this Society the
achievements of the force which he commanded in the North-West; Sir
Wilfrid Malleson has told us of the good work done under great
difficulties by his Mission on and beyond the North-East frontier, and
Major Blacker has added many details of hazardous enterprizes and
interesting episodes while he was with the Mission. Further south Sir P.
Sykes has narrated the vicissitudes and adventures of the forces under
him; and I propose now to give a short account of the comparatively
humble part taken by the troops in Bushire, and so to complete the tale
of the operations of British, or British-led, forces in Persia during
those eventful years. The operations, which form the subject of my
remarks, were at a late stage of the War, when all eyes were turned to
the momentous events then taking place on the Western front, and I do
not think that any reference was ever made to them in the English Press;
consequently few people know that they ever took place. They involved
no serious fighting, and I cannot claim that they were of any great
importance—the interest of these small side-shows in remote countries
lies, perhaps, mainly in the fact that they help us to realize how
immense was the front occupied, wholly or in part, by the fighting
forces of the British Empire, extending as it did from the western
frontiers of India across Persia to Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Egypt,
thence carried on by the Navy to Salonika, and so through the north of
Italy to France and the shores of Great Britain. Before I touch on the
actual operations, I must give a short account of the events which led
up to them. Bushire has, for many years, been the headquarters of our
activities in the Persian Gulf. Before the War we had there a Political
Resident who was also the Consul-General for Fars, and was provided with
a small guard of Indian soldiers; a post which, at the outbreak of war,
had been held for more than ten years by Sir Percy Cox. There were also
a Russian and a German Consulate-General, and France was represented by
a Consul. It will perhaps be remembered that in 1914, before the Turks
had definitely declared themselves on the side of our enemies, a brigade
was sent from India and landed at Bushire, so as to be ready in case of
emergency. When, a few days later, war with Turkey was declared, this
force moved on at once towards Basra, leaving behind only a small
garrison of one battalion. It was known at this time that the German
Consul-General and his staff were actively intriguing against us, and
doing all in their power to stir up the tribes in the neighborhood to
attack Bushire, with the object, presumably, of embarrassing us and
drawing off troops from the more important theatres. The situation was
somewhat delicate, Bushire being neutral territory, but it was finally
decided to arrest the German Consul-General and his staff and deport
them to India. I need only add that documentary evidence afterwards
obtained fully justified this action. Among the staff was a certain Herr
Wassmuss, a dragoman of the Consulate, who, unfortunately, escaped
arrest and fled to the mainland, where he took up his residence among
the tribesmen near the coast. At first, well provided with funds,
wearing Persian dress, and passing himself off as a Mohammedan, he
succeeded, by means of liberal payments and still more lavish promises
in the name of the German Emperor, in organizing a series of night raids
in the peninsula, chiefly in the neighborhood of Rishahr, a place about
five miles south of the town itself, the site of the cable station and
the Indo-European Telegraph Department’s quarters and offices. Most of
the Europeans lived in this neighborhood, and the headquarters of the
garrison were here. Though no serious damage was done, these raids
produced a general feeling of insecurity, and necessitated the increase
of the garrison to two battalions. To understand the situation, I must
explain that the peninsula of Bushire is separated from the mainland by a
strip of mud flat, known as the Mashileh. This is about ten miles
across from east to west, and in .its narrowest part about seven miles
from sea to sea. The soil is mostly clayey; there is no regular road
across it, and though light wheeled traffic can cross it in dry weather,
the going is always very heavy in parts. After heavy rain, it is
passable for pack animals only with difficulty, and at certain states of
the tide and very high winds it is liable to be completely inundated by
the sea. Where the east side of the Bushire peninsula abuts on this
neck are low cliffs, precipitous in places and intersected by rocky
ravines. The method adopted by the tribesmen was for small parties to
cross the .Mashileh early in the night, and, making their way through
our outposts, to attack some European house or military establishment—
transport was a favourite target—and after the nearest troops had turned
out and much promiscuous firing had taken place, the raiders withdrew. A
more ambitious attempt took place in September, 1915, when a force of
some 600 tribesmen crossed over at night and concealed themselves in the
ravines on the edge of the high ground preparatory to attacking our
outpost line. Here they were discovered the following morning by our
patrols, and after some fighting, were driven out on to the plain, where
they were charged by a handful of cavalry and fled in disorder. After
this, though the night raids still continued, the enemy were
considerably disheartened by the losses they had suffered, and though
Wassmuss still continued his efforts to organize an attack in force,
they met with little response from the tribesmen. It was Wassmuss who
had organized the mutiny of the old Swedish Gendarmerie at Shiraz in
November, 1915, which resulted in the arrest of our Consul, Colonel
O’Connor, and the other British residents. These were kept in captivity
at Ahram, a small fort in Tangistan, and the residence of Zair Khidar,
the chief of the tribe. It was generally Wassmuss’s headquarters. It was
only about thirty miles from Bushire, and when I took over command at
the latter place in February, 1916, I was anxious to send out a small
force, and, by a sudden raid, to effect their release, and possibly the
arrest of Wassmuss. It appeared to me quite a feasible project, but I
was then under the orders of Sir Stanley Maude, to whom the project did
not commend itself. With our hands full as they were in Mesopotamia, he
was, perhaps not unnaturally, anxious to avoid the possibility of
further complications in South Persia. The prisoners were finally
released as the result of negotiations between the political officer and
the local chiefs, who were by this time becoming somewhat distrustful
of their German adviser, more especially as he was then very short of
funds. He stayed on in the country, however, until after the Armistice,
when he moved northwards, and was captured between Ispahan and Tehran.
He was, I believe, deported from Persia. After the release of the
prisoners matters quieted down considerably, but the tribes remained
paf3ively hostile; the part of the Indo-. European telegraph line, which
ran from Bushire to Shiraz, had been entirely destroyed, and we were
unable to repair it; the road was nominally open to caravan traffic, but
the exactions of the Chiefs on the route were so preposterous as to
make the cost of transport almost prohibitive. I calculated at that time
that it amounted to more than £50 a ton—and trade was at a standstill.
Thus, -though the distance from Bushire to Shiraz direct was only 180
miles by one of the main caravan routes of South Persia, we had no
communication with the troops there except via Bandar Abbas, and thence
by a circuitous route of over 300 miles. Early in 1917 the troops at
Bushire were taken out of the Mesopotamian Command and put directly
under India. At the same time the area of the Command, was extended to
include all garrisons in the Persian Gulf, and the Gulf of Oman, as far
east as Muscat. Sir P. Sykes has described the events in Shiraz, in June
and July, 1918, when the Indian troops there were attacked by a large
force of tribesmen, consisting principally of the Qashgais and their
allies, and their position was rendered somewhat precarious by the
wholesale defection of the South Persian Rifles he had raised. In June,
when it appeared as if the attack might develop into a more widespread
movement, a move from Bushire was contemplated, but at this, the hottest
season of the year, no operations could have been carried out in the
low country without entailing very heavy casualties from the climate.
The garrison of Bushire was, however, reinforced by two battalions, and
as it seemed probable that, unless some strong action was taken, another
similar, and perhaps more serious, situation might develop in the
autumn when the tribes were moving southwards to their winter quarters,
it was decided to make preparations for an advance to open up the road
when the weather became cooler. While fully recognizing that the
energetic action taken by the troops at Shiraz was the main factor in
preventing the movement from spreading, and in bringing about the
downfall of the Qashgai Chief and his following, I have no doubt that
the arrival of these reinforcements, and the rumours circulated of an
intended move from Bushire, had a considerable influence on the result.
The difficulties to be encountered were chiefly physical, and due to the
nature of the country to be traversed. No serious opposition was
anticipated from the local tribesmen, nor indeed were they capable of
opposing an organized advance, but there was some uncertainty as to what
the attitude of the Qashgais might be when their country was reached in
the neighborhood of .Kazerun, and it was considered advisable to have a
brigade available to meet contingencies in that direction. The first
serious obstacle was the Mashileh, which, as I have already said, was at
all times difficult for wheeled traffic, and rendered quite or almost
impassable for days together after heavy rain. Once across that, our
route lay over fairly easy and flat country as far as Boraz’jan,
thirty-nine miles from Bushire, and thence over gently undulating ground
to Daliki, fifteen miles further on, beyond which the hills were
entered. Daliki is the first place along the road where there is a good
supply of sweet water. In the country between it and the coast water is
almost everywhere scarce and brackish, and it was difficult to supply at
all a large force. The Rud Hilleh river is salt, though animals will
drink the water. Daliki stands about 400 feet above sea-level, and from
there to the Kazerun valley, 3,000 feet high, the road lies mostly
through rocky defiles, with two very steep and rocky ascents, never to
be forgotten by those who have travelled over them. These are the
Kutal-i-Malu, where the ascent is about 1.20& feet, and the ‹
Kutal-i-Kamarij, not quite so high. Beyond Kazerun again another very
difficult ascent, the Kutal-i-Dukhtar, led to the Dasht-i-Barm, and a
few miles further on there was a final long climb up to the
Kutal-i-Pir-i-Zan, the top of which is about 9,000 feet high. Thence the
descent to the Shiraz plain, some 5,000 feet above sea-level, is
comparatively easy and gradual. At this stage of the war, the number of
mules available in India was small, and quite insufficient for our
requirements, and though camels could be used as far as Daliki, only
mule transport could negotiate the road beyond that point until it had
been greatly improved. To get over the transport difficulty, it was
therefore decided to build a light railway as far as Borazjan;
originally it was intended to continue it to Daliki, but detailed
surveys of the ground showed that the difficulties were greater than we
had anticipated, and to avoid the delay which the extension would have
entailed, a cart-road was made, and supplies from railhead to the foot
of the hills were carried on light Ford lorries. This left all the pack
transport free for use beyond Daliki when the railway and road were
completed. Another difficulty was the water supply in Bushire itself,
which is not only deficient in quantity, but is so brackish that it has a
most trying effect on those who are obliged to drink it. I except the
inhabitants of Bushire, who have presumably become inured to it. Before
the war, Europeans had always obtained their drinking water from the
weekly mail steamers. In 1916 a condenser was erected, but though the
output from this was enough for the normal garrison, the water question
made any considerable concentration of troops impossible. We had,
therefore, to arrange that the additional units from India should not
arrive till those in Bushire had moved forward, and Daliki was the first
place where they could be concentrated in any force. By the 24th of
September, the preparations at the base had been completed, and the
railway constructed to just outside our outpost line. Meanwhile, the
Persian Government had agreed to the movement and had sent orders to
their officials to co-operate. Needless to say, these orders produced no
effect whatever on the tribes, who had for long been independent of all
Government control. The three local chiefs of Tangistan, Chahkutah, and
Borazjan, through whose country our route lay, and who in normal times
derived their revenue almost entirely from » rahdari,» an illegal impost
on all caravans passing up the road, had sent an ultimatum saying that
they would allow us to repair the telegraph, but that they would oppose
the construction of a railway to the last drop of their blood. With some
600 followers, they had entrenched themselves at Chaghadak on the far
side of the Mashileh, and occupied the date groves in its vicinity. It
was necessary to dislodge them before the work of carrying on the
railway could be proceeded with. This was done on September 28 by a
small column of one battalion of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and
two guns, who crossed over very early in the morning. The enemy bolted
as soon as their flank was turned and before the guns could get into
action, leaving their tents and all they had with them, including 20,000
rounds of ammunition, and after a little skirmishing in the date
groves, our columns occupied the wells at Chaghadak and Ali Changi. Our
losses in the fight were three killed and two wounded. This action
completely quelled all organized opposition, and though afterwards our
patrols were sometimes fired on, our camps sniped at night, and though
skirmishes between small parties occurred, little damage was done on
either side, and they in no way interfered with our progress. Before I
go any further, and in case anyone should be disposed to criticize the
operations from a purely military aspect, I would again lay emphasis on
the fact that this was in no way intended to be a punitive expedition.
My instructions were very clear that the object was to open up the trade
route to Shiraz and to restore the telegraph line, and that no military
operations were to be indulged in except such as were necessary to
carry out these objects. Owing to the treacherous nature of the ground
in parts, the construction of a railway across the Mashileh was not an
easy task, and it was not till the 22nd of October that it reached
Ahmadi, twenty-one miles from Bushire. Its construction and all
operations were also hampered by a serious outbreak of influenza among
the troops early in October. Our hospitals were full to overflowing, and
several battalions were practically out of action. Fortunately with us
the epidemic was not of a severe type, and the percentage of deaths
among the troops was comparatively small, but it was thought advisable
to delay the arrival of other units from India until the epidemic
declined. It was far more severe among the Persians, especially at
Shiraz, and among the Qashgais and other nomad tribes, and also among
our troops at Shiraz. On the arrival of railhead at Ahmadi, the leading
troops moved on to Borazjan. There was no opposition; the chief of
Borazjan, who was amongst those who fought against us at Chaghadak,
after hesitating for some time, finally decided to take to the hills,
and a successor was- appointed by the Persian Governor of Bushire.
Daliki was occupied a fortnight later, and the troops at once got to
work on improving the road beyond Borazjan. The remaining troops from
India were now arriving, and were pushed on up the line as they came,
and by. The middle of November. The concentration was completed, and the
force was organized as follows: (1) a striking force of four
battalions-of-infantry, a mountain battery, a machine gun company, and a
field company of Sappers and Miners. This force was commanded by
Brigadier-General Elsmie. (2) Two battalions of infantry, including the
Pioneer battalion laying the railway, two squadrons of cavalry, and a
field company of Sappers and Miners for work on, and defence of, the
line of communication. They also had a labour battalion attached. (3)
One battalion of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and an improvised
battery of artillery, who formed the garrison of Bushire. The total
strength of this force was about 11,000. The Indian troops with Sir P.
Sykes at Shiraz had also been put under me in August. As soon as the
road was fit for wheeled traffic up to Daliki, the striking force got to
work on the approaches to the Kutal-i-Malu. At this time we had some
trouble with hostile tribesmen in the Filifili Pass, which is the defile
where the road first enters the hills. These fired into our posts at
night, and made several attempts to ambush the picquets protecting the
working parties as they were on their way to their positions on the hill
tops. This necessitated our sending out small columns to try and round
them up, and though in this we were unsuccessful, the village in the
hills where they had their headquarters and where they had collected
supplies, was occupied and the supplies destroyed, and after this they
ceased to trouble us. By the end of November railhead had reached
Borazjan, though the line still required a considerable amount of work
to consolidate it, and make it capable of carrying supplies for the
whole of the striking force. The latter, working with great energy, had
so improved the track through the Filifili Pass and the approaches to
the Kutal-i-Malu as to make these easily passable for camels. They were
then preparing to tackle the Pass itself. Hereafter the procedure was
for the striking force to move slowly on ahead, making a practicable
track for camels as they went; the Pioneers, with the other company of
Sappers and Miners and the Labour corps, remained behind to consolidate
the railway track, complete the bridges, and then to make a well graded
and more permanent cart-road from railhead onwards. It is difficult to
convey to anyone with no experience of the roads in Southern Persia what
the old track up the Kutal-i-Malu was like. From the bridge over the
river an easy track followed the right bank for about two miles, and
then turned northwards into the hills and commenced to ascend. For the
first two miles the gradient was in most parts comparatively gentle, and
the track, though rocky and narrow in many places, presented no great
difficulty to loaded mules. It then turned up a deep depression from the
top of the range with a very steep ascent of about a mile. A zigzagged
and paved track had at some period been constructed, but the stones had
worn smooth with the passage of many caravans and this combined with the
steepness of the gradient made it almost impossible for mules and
horses to keep their footing on it. It had, therefore, been discarded in
favour of a very steep, narrow, and rocky track running up the opposite
side of the ravine, often ascending by a series of steps cut or worn in
the rock. Though the distance from Daliki to the top is only eleven
miles, I find that in 1911, with two squadrons of the C.I. Horse and a
convoy of about 600 mules, it took us seven hours—from 6 a.m. to 1
p.m.—before the bulk of the column was at the top, and even then the
rear-guard was far behind, looking after animals which had fallen or
cast their loads. We found it impossible to make anything of this track,
and a complete re-alignment round the far side of the spur which ran on
the east of the ravine was necessary. The men of the striking force,
however, worked with the greatest keenness, and assisted by the Sappers
and Miners, ably directed and inspired by General Elsmie, by the 19th of
December they had not only completed a good camel road to the top, but
had carried it on some nine miles further across the Khisht plain to
Charum, which was at the foot of the Kamarij Pass. When one considers
that this work was done entirely by troops with no previous experience
of road-making, and that from Daliki to the top of the Pass it entailed
much heavy rock-blasting, and that they had also to be constantly on
their guard against attack, it will, I think, be admitted that it was a
very creditable performance. With the aid of their working parties they
had also got a small detachment of Ford lorries up the Pass and these
were able to work between the top and Charum. The next obstacle to be
tackled was the Kamarij Pass, the ascent of which, though rather shorter
than the Malu, was still steeper and more rocky. This would bring us to
the Kamarij Plain, practically on a level with the Kazerun Valley and
distant only twenty-two miles from Kazerun itself. The self-appointed
ruler of Kazerun at that time was one Nasir Divan, a local chief who,
with a following of about 600 men, had taken an active part in the
fighting against our troops at -Shiraz, and we knew that he was trying
to collect men to hold the Pass against us. In the lower part of the
Kazerun Plain we should also be in contact with Qashquli branch of the
Qashgais, and there was some uncertainty as to what their attitude would
be. Reconnaissance showed that the top of the Pass was occupied by
riflemen, though not in very great strength, but a good position was
found for our mountain guns, and the day following our arrival at
Charum, the Pass was taken with a loss of only one sepoy killed and one
Indian officer wounded. This was due largely to the excellent
arrangements for covering fire made by General Elsmie, as the troops had
to attack up a very steep hill side, and though the enemy were few in
numbers, probably not more than 150, many of then held on stubbornly,
retiring only when our men reached the top^ ;» Once established m the
Kamarij Plain, we were in a position to occupy Kazerun at any time we
wished should the political situation render it advisable, but local
supplies «were, scarce and OUIL communications were not yet sufficiently
improved to enable me to feed anything but a very small force there.
The troops were, therefore, employed as before in making the road
passable for camels. The old track up the Kamarij Pass winds up the side
of a steep, and in places precipitous, ravine where no decent alignment
was possible, and a good deal of reconnaissance was required before a
practical alternative route was found, following up the left bank of the
Shapur River-for four miles and so turning the Pass on the west. The
making of this road and the improvement of the track onwards to Kazerun
kept the troops busy for several weeks. Meanwhile the Qashquli chiefs
had come in to see me, and expressed a desire for friendly relations,
and so relieved us of any anxiety on their account. Not that much trust
was to be placed in their protestations of friendship, but it was found
that the tribe had suffered so severely from the influenza epidemic,
losing several of their chiefs and a large proportion (probably not less
than 20 per cent.) of their fighting men, that they were in a very
humble mood, and incapable of offering any serious opposition to our
column. Nasir Divan had fled from Kazerun, though with a small following
he was still lurking in the neighborhood, and a new Governor appointed
by the Governor-General of Shiraz had been sent there. By the 25th of
January the advanced troops had completed their road up to Kamarij, and
from thence onward to the foot of the Kazerun Plain. It was only a good
camel track up the ascent, with no pretensions to being fit for wheeled
traffic, but with some assistance from the working parties several light
lorries had been brought up it, and could be used in the road beyond
Kamarij. By this time the communications in rear had been sufficiently
improved to enable us to keep up a constant stream of the necessary
supplies, and, on the 27th of January, Kazerun was occupied by the
headquarters of the striking force and two battalions without incident.
The following day the force from Bushire joined hands with the troops
from Shiraz who had advanced to Mian Kutal, a caravanserai situated on a
spur some way below the top of the Pir-i-Zan Pass and twenty-one miles
distant from Kazerun. We had now completed our task of opening up the
road throughout, and it remained only to finish the restoration of the
telegraph line. It must not be supposed that everything was quite plain
sailing, and that there were no difficulties to contend with. The
influenza epidemic kept many of the troops out of action for some weeks.
An outbreak of cholera at Daliki in the earlier part of the operations
caused some anxiety, but was fortunately prevented from spreading. The
locomotives at first sent from India were not sufficiently powerful for
the work required of them, and an extra strain was put on the railway by
the necessity of sending a daily supply of drinking water to all
detachments along the line between Bushire and Borazjan, as it was found
that the brackish water along the route, though drinkable in case of
necessity, had an injurious effect on the health of the troops when
continued for long. At the end of December and beginning of January
heavy rains and the irruption of the sea flooded the Mashileh and
considerably damaged the railway track. The temporary bridge over the
river at Ahmadi was swept away, and all this took some time to repair.
Meanwhile there was considerable difficulty in keeping up the supplies
for the advanced troops, and Colonel Tytler, who was in charge of the
line of communications, had many anxious days. The restoration of the
telegraph line was a somewhat lengthy business. Not only had the offices
been completely wrecked, all instruments destroyed, and all wire
removed, but the large iron posts which carried the wire had almost
everywhere been taken away. Being hollow, the villagers found them very
convenient for use as water pipes and for other similar purposes. Beyond
Daliki these heavy posts could only be carried on camels, and though a
light telegraph line was run through immediately behind our foremost
troops, with the many other calls on our transport their conveyance and
the completion of the permanent line was slow work. So far as I
remember, it reached Kazerun some time in February, and, from thence,
parties working from both ends took it on to Shiraz a few weeks later.
By the time we reached Kazerun the troops had become so experienced in
road-making, and both officers and men took so much interest in the work
that, in order to keep them occupied, it was decided to employ them in
improving the road onwards towards Shiraz. The very steep and rocky
ascent of the Kutal-i-Dukhtar, the Pass of the Maiden, we could do
nothing with, but a practicable line was found by which it could be
turned to the south. Beyond the top about five miles of easy and gradual
ascent leads to the fort of the last of the Kutals, the
Kutal-i-Pir-i-Zan, or Pass of the Old Woman. This, though longer than
any of the passes further south, was not quite so difficult in other
ways. It was an ascent of something over 4,000 feet in about six miles
by a zigzag, rough, and rocky track up a wooded hillside, steep in many
parts, especially near the top, but still somewhat less formidable than
the obstacles we had already surmounted. The nature of the ground, too,
lent itself better to re-alignment. This kept the troops busy until the
beginning of April, by which time the track had been so far improved
that General Elsmie, whose brigade had done the work, was able to take a
Ford car to the top of the Pass, and thence on into Shiraz, the latter
part of the road having been taken in hand by the troops of the Shiraz
garrison. General Elsmie was always somewhat reticent as to the amount
of assistance from the working parties required on the steeper parts of
the ascent, but those who knew the road in its former state will admit
that it was something of a feat to have taken a car under its own power
from Bushire to Shiraz, even if it did require a little pushing at some
of the worst places. In the early part of the year a second Labour corps
had been sent us, and while the troops were busy improving the upper
part of the road, the Pioneers and the two Labour corps were engaged in
making a good and, as I then hoped, a permanent, cart road from
‹Borazjan onwards. This, of course, entailed a great deal of
re-alignment and much heavy rock blasting on the hilly portions, as the
camel track made by the troops had gradients as steep as one in ten,
while the gradients on the cart road were, I think, nowhere steeper than
one in fifteen. By the middle of April I was able to leave Bushire in
the morning by train to Borazjan, and with two Ford cars and two light
lorries to meet us at rail-head, we reached the top of the Malu Pass by 1
p.m., with no enforced stoppages except those required to fill up our
radiators on the long ascent. A small party from the Survey of India was
attached to the force, and was able to make for the first time a
detailed map of the whole of the road from Bushire to Shiraz and a good
deal of the country on both sides of it, including areas which had never
before been explored. When we left, I was able to arrange for them to
remain in Shiraz for the summer, where, I have no doubt, they were able
to extend their survey considerably. So far as I can ascertain, their
work has not yet been published in any form accessible to the public.
After the declaration of the Armistice with Turkey, I had asked that a
few aeroplanes might be sent me from Mesopotamia, and a flight arrived
early in January, and were very useful in reducing to› submission any of
the remoter villages which were inclined to give trouble and so
avoiding the necessity of small expeditions into the hills. In February I
went by aeroplane from Kazerun to Shiraz. The visit was in the nature
of an official entry, representatives of the Governor- General and other
leading men among the Persians, as well as most of the British officers
of the garrison, being assembled on the landing ground to meet me. As a
dignified arrival it was hardly a success. My pilot, flying high over
the hills north of Kazerun, arrived above Shiraz at an elevation of
about 12;000 feet. He then cut off his engine and spiralled down, but,
unfortunately, when flattening out near the landing ground, the engine
refused to pick up, with the result that we came down in a very heavily
irrigated field some hundreds of yards short of our mark. The aeroplane,
after going a few yards, stood on its head with the propeller buried in
the mud, and after hovering for a few uncomfortable seconds in a
perpendicular position, when we were uncertain whether it was not going
to turn a complete somersault, finally subsided into a semi-recumbent
attitude, from which we had ignominiously to climb down into the mud.
During the three days I spent in Shiraz, the Governor-General did his
best to induce me to persuade our Government to leave a garrison there.
Possibly his recommendations were not wholly disinterested, as, taking
advantage of the security afforded by the presence of a British
garrison, he had carried his exactions far beyond the recognized limits,
and was somewhat doubtful what would happen when our protection was
withdrawn. He solved the difficulty by returning to Tehran before the
last of the troops left, and shortly afterwards, as is not unusual in
such cases, he was put in prison, and doubtless made to disgorge a good
deal of the riches he was credited with having amassed. Orders for the
withdrawal of the bulk of the troops were received early in March,
though, owing to the difficulty of providing the necessary ships to
transport them, it was not till the end of April that the move actually
commenced. One battalion and a mountain battery remained at Kazerun, and
a battalion at Bushire with a detachment at Borazjan. The remainder of
the line was taken over by the South Persian Rifles. After the mutiny of
the greater portion of this force in 1918, the remainder had been
disbanded and an entirely new force raised. These were recruited
chiefly, with the assistance of the Persian officials, from the settled
tribesmen in the vicinity of Shiraz and from other elements likely to
develop into good fighting men; the Persian officers were carefully
chosen, and under the able command of Major W. A. K. Fraser, now our
military attach^ at Kabul, they promised to develop into a very fairly
efficient body of men. They were, at any rate, a great advance on any of
their predecessors, and I confidently believe that they would in a
short time have been able unaided to police the whole road between
Shiraz and Bushire. For two years after this their fate hung in the
balance, and I cannot but think that the decision finally arrived at, to
discontinue the contribution towards their support made by the British
and Indian Governments, and so to bring about their disbandment, was a
mistaken policy. With some hope that the security of the line would be
maintained, I believe that some enterprising firm would have come
forward to take over the railway and the road we had with so much labour
constructed, and possibly to continue the cart-road through to Shiraz.
With the disbandment of the South Persian Rifles, and the consequent
almost certain relapse of this part of Southern Persia into its former
state of chaos and anarchy, it is not to be wondered at that no one
would risk their money in the country. Compared with the millions we
have spent in Mesopotamia, the sum required was almost negligible.
Eventually the railway was dismantled and removed, and the road,
neglected and never repaired, is no doubt rapidly deteriorating, and
will continue to do so until it is in a state little, if any, better
than that in which we found it. It is in the south of Persia, the
country south of a line drawn roughly from Seistan on the east to the
neighborhood of Kermanshah, that our interests, both strategical and
commercial, lie. It is a tract inhabited mainly by nomad tribes, where
the orders of the Tehran Government carry little or no weight, and where
it is only by playing off one tribe against another that the Persian
officials, unsupported by any armed force, can maintain a semblance of
authority. It is a country in which, so long as we hold India, we cannot
afford to see any foreign Power predominant. Lord Curzon, in his book
on Persia, written more than thirty years ago, has remarked that » Since
Sir John Malcolm first landed at Bushire, in 1800, down to the present
day, Persia has alternately advanced and receded in the estimation of
British statesmen, occupying now a position of extravagant prominence,
anon one of unmerited security. At one time she has been the occasion or
the recipient of a lavish and almost wanton prodigality; at another she
has been treated with penurious meanness.» And so it has been since
this was written. So long as the Russian menace to India continued to
haunt the minds of statesmen and soldiers, Persia occupied a prominent
place in the politics of the Middle East; since the entente with Russia
removed anxiety on that score, she has gradually sunk into the
background. We have yet to see what the policy of Russia is to be when
she emerges from the state of chaos into which she is now plunged; but
if Bolshevist activities are any guide, we may expect that Persia may
again be made use of to threaten our Indian possessions. We have heard
lately of agreements between the Turks and the Soviet Government, and
between Angora and Kabul, but an alliance with the Shiahs of Persia, »
feeble as allies and impotent as foes,» as Lord Curzon has described
them, is hardly likely to be courted by her Sunni neighbours to the east
and west, or the Christian Power to the north. Her weakness, indeed,
invites aggression, and the rich provinces to: the north-west and north
have before now excited the cupidity of the» peoples coterminous with
them. Every true friend of Persia must, therefore, view with regret the
present attitude of her Government towards Great Britain, inspired as it
doubtless is by pressure from outside; for it may well be that before
long she may be in need of a powerful friend who, from motives of
self-interest if for no other reason, might be ready to come to her
help.
The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and
Gentlemen,— after an interesting lecture of this kind, which also has
been very instructive regarding the nature of the roads of Persia, I
hope there are members of this Society who will now join in a
discussion, and thus add to the interest of the evening. Sir ARTHUR
HARDING : Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,— I have listened to this
lecture with peculiar interest, and for many reasons—one, that General
Douglas and myself co-operated together in Persia for a considerable
period before the war, and travelled and worked together in many parts
of it. I, myself, have in a sense partaken of some of the General’s
experiences in the rugged and difficult country which he has just been
describing to us, for it was my duty to ride from Tehran to Bushire in
order to meet the Viceroy of India, then Lord Curzon, who was about to
pay a State visit to the coasts of the Persian Gulf, and I remember very
vividly those horrible passes—the Pass of the Old Woman, the Pass of
the Daughter, and the one that is known as the Accursed Pass—of which it
is difficult to say to which we are to assign the palm for discomfort
and, sometimes, where a rider is not mounted on a very sure-footed
horse, positive peril. I remember, when I was at Shiraz on my way down,
calling on a man of great sanctity who lived there, and telling him what
apprehensions I had, and the reverend gentleman presented me with a
sacred ring which had for a long time belonged to him and had derived
additional sanctity from being on his finger, and he assured me it would
guarantee me against all possible dangers of the Kutals. I accepted it
very gratefully, and I am bound to say that its magic effect was not
only instantaneous, but instantaneous and constant; for at each Kutal I
managed to get down, sometimes getting off and leading my horse, but
without ever being pitched from his back. I fully share in the
admiration with which those of you who have heard General Douglas’s
lecture must regard the excessively able and successful way in which the
troops under his command negotiated this most difficult country. After
the wonderfully interesting lecture which he has given—it is scarcely
necessary for me to emphasize how difficult and how laborious a task it
must have been, and, I think enormous credit attaches to the officers in
charge of these complicated. And difficult operations. It seems to me
that they could hardly have had a more fitting chief than General
Douglas, for he is thoroughly accustomed to these wild tribes and their
disagreeable ways; and once, during my own stay in Persia, he was badly
wounded during his travels in Luristan. The effects of the wound are no
more visible than are the effects of the laborious campaign which he
underwent in the hot neighborhood of Borazjan and Bushire, and which has
left him as young as, if not younger than he was when we laboured
together at Tehran. (Applause.) Well, ladies and gentlemen, what he has
told us makes him, to a certain extent, an important pioneer, because,
as he has told us, Persia was one of the few countries at the time the
war broke out, claiming to be civilized, which possessed scarcely any
railways—a little single line from Tehran to Shah Abdul-Azim being the
only one on which trains could move by steam. All the time we were
there, great railway projects were constantly being discussed, but I
doubt whether any of the schemes actually embraced the difficult task of
a railway junction between Tehran and Bushire through the Kutals. There
was talk of lines down to Ahwaz, through a very similar country, or
down to Bandar Abbas, or best, and most practicable of all, if the Turks
would have allowed it, and they probably would—because of the profits
of the corpse traffic—from Baghdad to Basra. All these schemes fell
through, largely, I think, because of the jealousies of Great Britain
and Russia; whatever was proposed by one would be vetoed by the other,
and to this day there are no railways in Persia of any importance. In
fact, I presume that Persia, during the last few years, has been in a
state of retrogression rather than progress. When we were there, the
situation was somewhat different. The struggle with Russia, which, to a
certain extent, was terminated by her defeat in the Japanese war, was
still at its height. Russia was, in those days, pursuing her path of
conquest, by gold rather than by arms, by continual loans to the Persian
Government, by acquiring that monopoly of furnishing supplies which has
been the secret of the ascendancy of the House of Commons in this
country, and, in fact, by reducing the Shah and his rather venal body of
surrounding ministers and high functionaries into mere recipients of
Russian gold. That state of things could only be met on our part by our
financing the Persian Government in our turn. It was difficult to do so,
because they had no means of raising an internal loan, and their treaty
with Russia precluded them from making any foreign loan except with St.
Petersburg. The only way we could get over that was to use the Imperial
Bank of Persia, which was an English institution disguised as Persian,
to advance certain funds supplied to it by the Government of India.
That, to a certain extent, helped to break the power of Russia; and it
was completed by the catastrophe in Japan. The Persian Government in
those days affected a certain sympathy with Russia; but I remember being
told by a Persian prince that, when the news arrived of the final
defeat of the Russian fleet, the Heir-Apparent to the throne of Persia,
who it was thought was by way of being a strong Russophile, called him
back and said, » Is the news really true?» and he added, «It seems too
good to be true.» Then he hastened, with all his courtiers, to condole
with great cheerfulness with the Russian representative. As a mere
commentator—a respectful, admiring, and sympathetic commentator—on my
old friend General Douglas’s most inspiring paper, I had better resume
my seat; but I feel sure that all those who have heard his lecture will
have derived much interesting information from it, as well as from the
admirable illustrations by which he has rendered it more vivid. These
enabled all of us to appreciate far more fully, and in a far more lively
manner than we otherwise would have done, the most interesting address
which he has given us. (Applause.) Sir GEOEGE KIBKPATEICK : Sir Edmund
Barrow, Ladies and Gent lemen,— The operations which General Douglas has
described in such an interesting manner were really the closing stage
of a series which, when viewed in retrospect from the beginning of the
war, have very outstanding characteristics. In the first place, it must
be remembered that with operations in a country such as Persia, where
whole districts will be affected by the success or the non-success of a
small body of troops, then what in the big theatres of war would be
regarded as not merely minor, but insignificant, operations become in
themselves of great importance. Now when war broke out, to the
authorities of India Persia presented a great problem. We soldiers
wanted to save all our troops, all our forces, all our material, and all
our transport for theatres of major importance, where decisive results
would be obtained ; and we looked with disfavour on any proposal for a
diversion of force. Bat, unfortunately for us, owing to Herr Wassmuss,
of whom you have heard, we had to deal with the problem of Southern
Persia. We were troubled by a series of attacks, minor, but none the
less harassing and anxious, on account of the feature which I have
mentioned— that the reverse of a small body in those parts would have
great political results throughout that region, and would be magnified
beyond all measure in the reports that would be circulated. It became
apparent that we should have to .restore order. That restoration of
order was done in Southern Persia in two divisions. After some local
operations on the borders of Mekran, the South Persia Rifles, under Sir
Percy Sykes, undertook the opening of the roads and restoration of order
in the provinces of Kerman and Fars. Then during this period the troops
at Bushire had a time of patient waiting. Their patience was sorely
tried, not only by the provocation which was put upon them through the
local tribesmen, inspired by German agency, but also by the natural
desire to rescue their fellow-countrymen and fellow country-women who
had been captured at Shiraz, and were in captivity just outside their
outposts. At the same time the higher military authorities directing
operations could not run the risk of any failure in such an undertaking
as that to release the prisoners, nor could they spare the forces to
make a certainty of that operation. Therefore, as General Douglas
mentioned, we had to wait. Well, after a period, in which these
communications were restored, came another time early in May, June, and
July, 1918, when, probably largely influenced by German successes in
France, the situation in Persia—in Southern Persia particularly—most
distinctly depreciated. It resulted in the rising of Shiraz, against
which Sir Percy Sykes made headway, and afterwards he did much to
restore order. We had then to consider the question of the restoration
of the communications, and it became evident that amongst the
communications the most important was the road from Bushire to Shiraz.
We had had accounts of its difficulties; we knew that in General Douglas
on the spot we had a commander well acquainted with the road, and the
tribesmen, and the difficulties to be met. We realized our good fortune
in that, and we deliberately then began to make preparations for what we
knew must be a very methodical and arduous operation such as General
Douglas has described; and we managed to be able to supply him with some
railway material and sufficient mules to enable him to advance slowly
stage by stage. It is of great significance to note that in this
campaign we put to use mechanical appliances in a country where really
it was very doubtful whether it could be done. A point General Douglas
has not mentioned—very modestly—is that unless the operations were
completed as arranged the climatic conditions in a very few weeks would
have increased the strain on the troops beyond all measure. He has told
you how he carried through the operation, and in doing so he has not,
perhaps, done himself full justice—although he has his troops. It was
due very largely to his previous knowledge, to his careful foresight,
and to his methodical preparation that he was enabled to carry out that
work successfully. Remember that Bushire itself is an undeveloped
harbour; in fact, it is no harbour. Ships of any size have to lie one or
two miles out. There are no proper landing appliances and no proper
roads into the port itself. There were no means of handling, when he
first got it, the railway material with which to construct his initial
railway, and no proper place to store his supplies; and he was faced
always with that mud marsh of Mashileh before he could get to dry land.
Remembering these things, I think you will agree with me that not only
was his lecture exceedingly interesting, but it was a very modest
account of his performance. (Applause.) Mr. DONALD MELLOR : Mr.
Chairman, we have listened with very great pleasure to General Douglas’s
lecture, and to all of us who take an interest in the development of a
country like Persia, and the outposts of India, I think we must agree
that the work which General Douglas directed will always stand as a
monument to his ability and energy. I think with the last speaker that
he has certainly underestimated the work that he did himself; for it is
very well known that without a good leader the men would not work. In
these things also the general public very often forget the energy of the
officers and of the men, from the highest down to the lowest, that has
to be put through in carrying out such an undertaking. I very much
regretted, when reading the other day as regards the railway through
Baluchistan from Quetta, that there was a hint that part of that line,
if not all of it, is to be taken up. That was mentioned by one of the
papers with regret, which I re-echo myself. That line, although not
exactly a gold mine, certainly has developed trade along the route to a
remarkable extent; and to those gentlemen like General Douglas, who have
done good work in the outposts of the Empire, it must be a galling
thing that work which they have carried through so conscientiously, and
which, if it had been backed up in England, would have led both to
further development and towards the peace of the world, has not been
seconded as it should have been. The CJIAIBMAN: If no one else will say
anything more, it remains for me to make some comments. To me the most
interesting feature of all in this discussion has been the clear
conception that has been given to us, both by lantern illustrations on
the wall and by the lecture and the discussion, of the immensely
difficult road over which General Douglas succeeded in taking his
troops. That road is, of course, a historic road. It has been used for
hundreds, even thousands, of years, and, I suppose, originally it was
fairly well aligned and probably fairly well kept. But you see the
results of Asiatic rule during these long ages. When you looked at those
pictures that were put before us you could appreciate what is meant in
Central Asia by the term » road.» A road is nothing like what we are
accustomed to in this country, or anywhere in Europe; and some of the
so-called roads that I have been over, and which are designated in our
maps by beautiful thick lines, have shown me how deceptive our own maps
often are when dealing with countries with which we are unacquainted.
Once you have been over those roads you know that a map road is of
little use to you until you have been over it yourself. Another point I
would like to mention is that we were very fortunate during the war in
having available for this particular job an officer like General
Douglas, who knew the country thoroughly. He had been over that road, I
suppose, half-a-dozen times before the war, and therefore was thoroughly
acquainted with the difficulties he would have to cope with, and could
make previous arrangements which would suffice to overcome them. That, I
think, illustrates very clearly the fact that in Asiatic countries the
difficulties of warfare must not be measured solely by the fighting. The
main difficulties are moving and feeding troops. On that subject
General Douglas, if time had permitted, could no doubt have told us a
good deal more than he did, but it is evident that his troops largely
overcame those difficulties by their own labours. They reconstructed
this road; and the road, though bad from our point of view no doubt, was
infinitely better than anything that had been seen in that part of
Persia for a very long time. I am sure you will all join with me in
giving a very cordial vote of thanks to General Douglas for his
interesting lecture, and the trouble he has taken in putting before us
the difficulties of his little campaign. (Applause.) One word I would
like to add; it is with reference to remarks made by the last speaker—I
am sorry I did not catch his name. He expressed great regret that the
labour of those generals and officers in distant lands should be thrown
away, and all those roads disappear into the oblivion that their
predecessors so justly merited. But I do not think that is the case
altogether. I hope in these more civilized times something may happen
which will enable Persia in the future to be more readily accessible to
trade and commerce, either by railways or by good roads. We have two
approaches which may help us in future. One is the approach from
Mesopotamia, a good deal of which was improved enormously during the
war, and the other is the approach from Quetta, via the Nushki line, to
Duzd-ab. That railway still exists, and I hope it may continue to do so;
because already the trade by it has enormously increased. Mention of
that fact will give some satisfaction to the last speaker. Ladies and
gentlemen, in your name-I propose a very cordial vote of thanks to
General Douglas. (Renewed applause.)
هیچ نظری موجود نیست:
ارسال یک نظر