سلام
یک داکیومنت خیلی جالب از تجارت در بوشهر (ابوشهر یا Bushire) در سال های بین 1862 تا 1914:
در این داکیومنت می خوانید که بوشهر بزرگترین و مهم ترین بندر برای کشتی های بخاری در خلیج فارس بوده است و …
با زحمت بسیاری این مدرک رو برای شما آماده
کردم و امیدوارم برای درک تاریخ تجارت در بوشهر (ابوشهر یا Bushire) به
شما مردم عزیز استان بوشهر کمک شایانی کند.
British India Steamers and the Trade of the Persian Gulf, 1862-1914
STEPHANIE JONES
The economic and political
significance of the Persian/ Arabian Gulf has increased dramatically
since the First World War. Yet, in the mid· nineteenth century, the
region was comparatively unknown and unexplored by Europeans, a
backwater in the expanding network of world trade Why then did Sir
William Mackinnon the founder of the British India Steam Navigation
Company (B I ), inaugurate the first regular steamship service from
Bombay and Karachi to Basra and intermediate ports in 1862? What impact
did the B.l. steamers have on the development of the Gulf by 1911 ?
This paper is pan of a larger study of the history of the Inchcape Group
of Companies› which includes an assessment of one of its most prominent
subsidiaries the Middle Eastern traders and port managers, Gray
Mackenzie & Company Limited As Gray, Paul & Company and Gray,
Mackenzie & Company, this firm represented the B.I. as shipping
agents at the principal Gulf ports the former at Bushire, Lingah,
Bahrain and Bander Abbas, and the latter at Basra Mohommerah and
Baghdad.
I
British maritime interest in
the Persian Gulf had begun with an expedition to Persia of 1615 by East
India Company vessels seeking new markets which was followed by the
establishment of trading posts or ‹factories›, including chose at Bander
Abbas in 1623 and Basra in 1635 Originally regarded as of commercial
importance only, with the late eighteenth century consolidation of the
empire in India, Britain became more concerned with the establishment
and maintenance of friendly diplomatic and strategic links with Persian
pores and cities The Ease India Company ‹factories› were seen as
directly related to the preservation of British fortunes in India and
were gradually replaced by a network of Government of India Residencies
and agencies The Gulf Residency at Bushire, established in 1763 had by
the mid-nineteenth century, assumed responsibility for British
interests in the whole Gulf area ‹ At the same time British seapower had
become pre-eminent since the destruction of the Jawasmi pirates (1819)
and the establishment of the maritime peace after the General Treaty of
1820 With the Gulf also gaining importance as a possible line of
communication between Britain and India, both Russian influence in
Persia and Egyptian expansion towards Kuwait and Hasa were seen with
great concern The cap· cure of Kharg Island in 1838 was motivated
partly by strategic calculations and partly by visions for this basis to
become an entrepot in the manner of Singapore, but with the passing of
the Muhamad Ali crisis the occupation force was withdrawn British
political interest in the region remained strong (another war was fought
against Persia in 1856- 7), but there was little Indian and much less
British trade and shipping to provide a substantial basis for an
expansionary policy.
It was under these unpromising
circumstances that BI was to initiate its services to and throughout the
Gulf The company had been founded in 1856 as the Calcutta and Burmah
Steam Navigation Company in order to provide a regular service between
Calcutta and Rangoon that was, significantly Supported by a subsidy from
the Bengal government Five years later, reflecting its leaders›
ambitions to operate from the Bay of Bengal to the west coast of India,
its name was changed to British India Steam Navigation Company; its
crest showed, even more ambitiously, the British lion holding a globe
presenting the whole Indian Ocean to the viewer Incorporated at Glasgow,
B.I. ‹s nominal capital amounted to £400,000, well calculated to give
it pre· dominance in its field In this it was greatly helped by Sir
Henry Bartle Frere, a member of the Council of India and from 1862 to
1867 Governor of Bombay Frere was the principal architect of a series of
transport plans for India that included mail subsidies for steamer
services around the Indian coast from Calcutta to Karachi At the behest
of Frere (a friend of B.I. ‹s leader William Mackinnon) in 1862 the
contract for these subsidies was awarded to BI which had shown itself
experienced and capable of delivering the goods on the Rangoon run
In the same year 1862 Frere
received permission from the India Office for his proposal to subsidise a
new mail service into the Gulf Thus the general British mail subsidise
system was extended to the furthest comers of the empire; altogether the
British government by this time paid out some £l million an11ually in
such subsidies A subsidise was necessary in inducing a company to
provide a regular service for two reasons Firstly, the steamers of the
early 1860’s, with their large consumption of coal, technical
unreliability and need for skilled engineers were frequently uneconomic
to operate, even with full cargoes Secondly, the market for foreign
goods in the Gulf and the availability of cargoes for export could not
be relied upon to provide sufficient freight to make a regular steamship
service pay
In a broader context, Frere was
also interested in the possibility of developing the Gulf as an
alternative overland and maritime route between Britain and India Before
the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, trade was channeled via the Cape
while mail and passengers went overland across Egypt via Suez and the
Red Sea Another concern of Frere’s was the development of an ‹Indian›
mercantile marine which the Government of India could employ in an
emergency
In advancing the case for a
formal, subsidised British presence in the Gulf Frere was also
responding to the fears expressed in England and India of the
‹dangerously ambitious projects of Russia› As early as 1839 a political
pamphlet maintained that «if Russia had never crossed the Caucasus, the
intercourse of England with Persia would now have been purely
commercial; it is the ambition of Russia that forces upon us the
necessity of endeavouring to preserve that which is obviously necessary
to our own protection The integrity and independence of Persia is
necessary to the security of India and of Europe; and any attempt to
subvert the one is a blow struck at the other- an unequivocal act of
hostility to England» The mail contract was seen as a way of upholding
British commercial interests and reinforcing the existing British
political presence in the Gulf against the Russian threat
One of three tenderers for the
Gulf contract, B.I. was in a particularly advantageous position for the
award: Mackinnon had carefully cultivated his acquaintance with Frere,
making it clear that his company was keen to expand their Indian coastal
connections In the report and assessment of the tenders it was agreed
that BI offered «a decided superiority as respects the class of vessels»
, «a fixed rate of speed», and with «no interruption to the present
efficient service to Karachi» The two local firms attempting to compete
complained that B.I. was gaining a monopoly in Indian waters, but the
Bombay Government pointed to the poor performance of the local shipping
services and maintained that «the Government and the Public may expect a
more efficient service from the Burmah Company (B.I. ) than from either
of the other tenderers » By choosing B I rather than a local company
the Government of Bombay were ensuring not only the provision of a
reliable shipping line but the representation of British commercial
interests B.I. in the Gulf may be seen as an example of how the state
assisted private enterprise in opening up new areas to British trade and
to British political influence, in the same way that the P & 0
vessels may be seen as ‹flagships of imperialism›.
Thus the establishment of B.I.
and Mackinnon’s interest in expanding its subsidised network of services
coincided with the Government of India’s long term plans to pro· mote
Indian coastal communications and thus create feeders to its
metropolitan trunk line to Britain through the services of the P & 0
Two short-term factors which may have prompted the Indian Government
and Mackinnon, to take such an interest in the Gulf were, firstly, the
disruption in the supplies of cotton to Britain and India as a result of
the American Civil War which acted as a stimulus to the growing of
cotton in Persia; and, secondly the recent construction of telegraph and
cable lines through the area It is unlikely, however, that Mackinnon
would have been prepared to inaugurate a costly steamer service in the
interests of extending Indian coastal communications and to exploit a
short-lived cotton boom: undoubtedly the subsidy, and the prospect of
its frequent renewal and possible increase was the deciding factor It
has been suggested that Mackinnon gained the contract because he
happened to be passing through Bombay at the time when the mail
contracts were being put out to tender Certainly he knew, from his
Calcutta-Burma experience, what an edge a mail contract gave the firm
holding it over competing steamer concerns Appendix I shows that
Mackinnon’s confidence was justified
B.I. ‹s coastal services were
managed by Mackinnon’s merchant partnership in Calcutta, Mackinnon
Mackenzie & Company which he had founded as his first trading
venture in India in 1847 With the expansion of the activities of B.I.
the operation of a large network of shipping lines was seen as possible
only through the parallel provision of shipping agents at each
strategic port In this context, many of the merchant partnerships that
were eventually to form the lnchcape Group of Companies played a vital
role in the day-to-day running of the B.I. In selecting his
representatives, Mackinnon gave priority to trusted friends and
relations In 1865, he appointed Gray, Dawes & Company as his London
Agents Archibald Gray was one of his nephews, and Edwin Sandys Dawes had
been a P. & O. officer who had made a particularly favourable
impression on the B.I. Chairman Gray and Dawes were responsible for the
formation of the two partnerships which managed the greater part of B.I.
‹s Gulf interests The creation of these partnerships was necessary as
there were virtually no British mercantile houses already in the Gulf
which might undertake the work Consequently, in contrast with the
situation in India where established firms took up the agencies,
Mackinnon, Mackenzie & Company and B.I. had to set up agency firms
in the Gulf from scratch Men formerly employed by the parent firms were
obvious candidates To join the new partnership and manage it at Bushire,
Robert Paul was sent out from Calcutta, where he from c 1860 had worked
as an assistant in Mackinnon, Mackenzie & Company in charge of
their piece goods sales Gray, Paul & Company was officially founded
in 1865 Recruited as an assistant to Paul in Bushire in 1866 was George
Mackenzie who in 1869 helped found the associated partnership of Gray
Mackenzie & Company in Basra. Gray Dawes & Company acted as
their London brokers The two partnerships in effect acted as one company
keeping one ‹et of accounts and maintaining a close correspondence
Details of the investments which the partners made in the B.I. Gulf
agencies have survived from 1880 Gray and Dawes each invested £9,461 in
the Bushire branch £8,110 at Basra and £934 for representation at
Baghdad totaling over £18,000 each Robert Paul although a junior
partner, invested over £16,000 in the venture, and George Mackenzie over
£17,000.
II
In assessing the impact of the
B.I. steamers on the trade and life of the Gulf ports, it is important
to consider the nature of the service they provided This is
comprehensively described in the B.I. handbooks • which also reveal the
vital role played in the service by its shipping agents The earliest
surviving handbook that of 1866 shows that B.I. ‹s fortnightly service
between Bombay and the Persian Gulf originally called at the ports of
Bombay, Muscat, Bander Abbas, Bushire and Basra with additional stops at
Lingah and Bahrain • Despite the navigational difficulties and dangers
of the Gulf,10 B.I. from the beginning made all attempts to maintain its
schedule of sailings not in the least because non-performance of the
mail contract entailed heavy penalties Thus a connection was made with
the other mail services to Calcutta, and after 1869 the B.I. timetable
was coordinated with that of the 1› & 0 Suez route At the other end,
the Persian Gulf service in effect terminated at Baghdad, as it
connected with the ri,·er steamers of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam
Navigation Company Managed by another British firm Lynch Brothers- first
established in Baghdad in 1841 this service provided eight trips per
year receiving a subsidy of £2 400 compared with B.I. ‹s of
approximately £6 000 » In addition to the carriage of mails, the B.I.
steamers provided a passenger and cargo service Cabin passage (which
cost approximately £20 per head from Bombay LO Basra, with a reduced
Cart› to nearer ports) included food but not wines, and the pro· vision
of bedding, linen and furniture by the company Quarter deck passengers,
travelling at just over half of the cabin fare, were allowed space for a
bed on the poop and a trunk of five cubic feet All native servants were
classed as deck passengers, although European servants travelled at
half the first class fare and European maid servants with a berth in
their mistress› cabin were charged at two-thirds the cabin rate All
berths were booked through B.I. ‹s agents, who ensured that all
passengers gave up any weapons on embarkation and that freight on excess
luggage was paid at double rates No indication is given in the handbook
of the nature of this passenger trade B.I. enjoyed a share of the
Moslem pilgrim traffic to Jeddah from 1869, but it is not known if Gray
Mackenzie or Gray Paul were involved A notebook kept by Gray and Dawes
in London, which refers to the Gulf service, noted the rules of the
carriage of pilgrims in 1891, quoting a letter from Basra, so it is
possible that the firms took part in this trade Memoirs and
reminiscences of employees- to be discussed later – suggest that
European passengers were few and far between Thus presumably the greater
pan of the trade would have been the carriage» of local merchants and
labour in search of work A Custom House pass was required for all
packages shipped; the freight being pre· paid at the port of shipment 8 1
‹s agents had to supervise the landing of cargo at the ports of
delivery in their own or hired boats and the deposit of goods on wharves
in receiving vessels or lighters, or in store, emphasising that they
could not guarantee against delays They had to check that Bills of
Lading accurately described the con· tents of packages carried,
especially to enforce the ban on dangerous cargoes such as gunpowder or
sulphuric acid The agents required that goods for shipment should t>e
alongside at least twenty-four hours before departure: the handbook
warned that «most of the mistakes arise through shippers sending their
goods at the last moment» The agents were liable to be paid in a great
variety cf coinage, and thus had to provide their own banking service By
the mid 1860s, the trade in horses, ponies, bullocks, sheep and goats
was increasing in importance Shippers had to provide fodder for their
animals, but the charge included the passage of a ‹syce› or groom in
attendance on each horse Horses were required to have their shoes
removed, and coir mailing was provided to prevent them slipping Finally
Gray Mackenzie and Gray Paul were also responsible for organising the
carriage of specie on B ! steamers Such were the dangers of loss or
theft, however, that they refused to undertake to land valuables;
instead, they were delivered only by the presentation of the appropriate
Bills of Lading on board The B.I. handbook of 1866 clearly shows that
this service to the Gulf ports was only one of eight lines already in
operation in that year: their role in this region must be considered in
the context of B ! ‹s shipping services as a whole This included four
services from Calcutta: monthly to Rangoon, Moulrnein and the Straits,
and fortnightly to Moulmein, Akyab and Bombay coasting They also
operated two monthly lines between Madras and Rangoon, and to China and a
fortnightly service between Bombay and Karachi The operation of the
Gulf service, and the further services shown in Appendix I, may be
considered through an analysis of the impact of the B.I. presence at
each of the major Gulf ports in three respects Firstly, did the service
lead to an increase in the entrances and clearances of shipping tonnage?
Secondly, did the advent of the B.I. steamers result in an increase in
the value of imports and exports at each port, particularly in regard to
their trade with Britain, first via re-exports from India and through
the on-carriage of cargoes by the P. & O. and from 1874 directly
through the four weekly ‹home line› from London via Aden and Karachi?
Finally, how important were Gray Mackenzie and Gray Paul in the merchant
communities of the ports and what were the problems of managing this
service? It is thus hoped to contribute to the larger question of the
role of British shipping in the Gulf in the expansion of British
commerce into hitherto remote and little-known corners of the world
economy in the latter half of the nineteenth century, thereby staving
off the rise of foreign competition for British industries.
III
Bushire in the late-nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries was the most prominent of the growing
steamer ports in the Gulf the gateway to the interior of Iran, and the
home of the British Persian Gulf Residency » An essential port of call
of the service, Appendix 2 shows that the number and tonnage of B I
steamers entering and clearing Bushire rose from 26 vessels of an
aggregate tonnage of 26 000 in 1873 to 104 vessels of 95,000 tons by
1885, an increase of over 300% in just over ten years » The inauguration
of the B.I. service and the opening of the Suet Canal, encouraged the
entry of other steamer companies into the Gulf trade, as outlined in
Appendix I This led to a reduction in the prominence of B I shipping at
this port from over 70% to 44% By 1885, the B.I. Steamers were competing
with the British registered, but locally managed Bombay and Persian
Steam Navigation Company with 21,360 tons of steam shipping entering
Bushire: the Persian Gulf Steam Navigation Company, similarly British
registered with 24,640 tons; the French steamers with 12,240 tons: and
another 61,000 tons of miscellaneous steam tonnage After 1885, the
statistics available do not separate 8 1 vessels from other British
steamers which, by 1904, represented 96 7% of all steamers trading at
Bushire It is thus clear that the arrival of the B.I. service at this
port played a significant part in the sustained and dramatic growth in
the use of the
port by steamers: although it
faced increasing competition, by the turn of the century, it was still
by far the largest single company operating from the port, and offered
the most regular and frequent service.» Only in the years immediately
preceding the First World War did other major British steamer lines make
headway in the Persian Gulf trade. Stricks, the Bucknall Steamship
Lines and S.E. Guthe & Co. (the West Hanlepool Steam Navigation
Company) came to a joint agreement in this trade in 1903 from which Gut
he withdrew on its expiry in 1909. The previous year, Bucknalls was
purchased by Ellermans who continued to provide, with Stricks, a rival
U.K. to Gulf service until the outbreak of war.
What influence did this
increase in shipping tonnage have on the trade of Bushire? The value of
imports into the port rose from under half a crores of rupees in 1873 to
nearly 1 ½ crores in 1903, * representing an increase of over 300%.
This reflects the development of Bushire and its hinterland as a market
for British goods.
* 1 crore equals 10.000.000, but being 100 lacs of 100,000 each, it was always written as 1 .00.00.000
Appendix 3 shows that whereas
only 16% of the value of imports into Bushire in 1873 was accounted for
by goods from Britain. by 1897 the proportion had increased to 68%.
Indian imports had exceeded 51% in 1873: by 1897, they represented only
18%. Bushire’s exports from 1873 to 1898 by value increased from
39,20,729 rupees to 68,27 ,550; in 1873 8% were shipped to the U.K. and
33% to India. By 1898, the proportions were 27% and 17% respectively.
Other variables. besides the impact of the B.L steamers, need to be
taken into account in this shift in the direction of Bushire’s trade,
such as changes in other trade routes, the harvest fluctuations in
Persia and the fact that a plague epidemic at Bombay virtually dosed it
as a port in 1896- 9. However, B.l. ‹s role in the expansion of
commercial links between Bushire and Britain was vital.
Imports into Bushire in 1873-
which numbered over 150 separate items- included cattle, drugs, fruit
and vegetables, glass, grains, hides, metals, oils, seeds, tobacco,
timber and wool. By the late 1890s, the most important items (by value)
imported into Bushire were cotton piece, goods, shirtings, copper, and
guns, cartridges and other arms from Britain, with cotton goods, rice
and sugar from India. A detailed insight into the exports carried by
B.l. steamers from Bushire in the period September 1866 to September
1869 is provided by a return kept by Gray Paul: the commodities listed
were specie, pearls, cotton, silk, almonds, grain, gallnuts, cumin
seeds, opium, safflower, ghee, rosewater, horses, carpets, dried fruit
and wool.» By the late 1890s Bushire’s export trade included guns
(imported from Britain and re-exported to Muscat), almonds, gum, hides
and specie to India, and tobacco to Egypt. The third of its exports
which were dispatched to the U.K. comprised wool, carpets, mother of
pearl shells and opium. Evidence of a shift from primary to secondary
production at Bushire was slight.
Bushire’s imports practically
always exceeded the value of exports from the port. Where local
manufacturing besides local crafts for immediate use was limited to the
production of a small number of copper coffee pots only. B. I. and its
agents thus became interested in the development of local trades to pay
for the imports, especially because the balance of payments difficulties
of the Gulf ports were exacerbated by the scarcity of coin: gold bad
practically disappeared, silver was rare and even copper hard to obtain.
The opium trade in particular helped to solve this problem: the ready
market for the drug in Hong Kong and Singapore initially encouraged its
cultivation in Persia, and with the rise in poppy seed prices in Europe
in the mid 1870s, it was also shipped to England and the U.S.A. By 1879,
the price of a case of opium (of 140 lbs each) had risen from 280 to
615 Maria Theresa dollars, or nearly £70.» B.l. then decided to enter
the trade, employing three brand new steamers, the Culna, Ellora and
Chindwara, all over 1,900 tons gross, which carried a total of 215 cases
to Hong Kong.» As the production of Persian opium increased, from 1,560
chests in 1868-9 to over 5.000 chests per year in the 1880s and 1890s,
the importance of B.I. in this trade grew. By 1888, when steamers of B.
I. carried 886 1/2 chests of opium to Hong Kong, their share in the
trade reached 40%, exceeded only by the Bombay and Persian Steam
Navigation Company which shipped 1,175 chests. The Persian Gulf Steam
Navigation Company carried fifty chests to London and a further
thirty-six to Hong Kong. In 1894, the 1.493 chests (worth over £100,000)
carried by B.I. to Hong Kong represented 44% of the total opium exports
from Bushire. In 1901, when the new B.L services which began in 1904
were first discussed, it was hoped that the employment of more vessels
in the carriage of cargoes (in addition to the fast mail line) would
lead to an even larger share of the opium trade.
The imports of firearms into
Bushire from Britain were substantial, and although the bulk of the
trade was carried by smugglers in local craft, it is likely that B.l.
vessels played some part in it. Flourishing after the Third Afghan War
of the late 1870s, the British and Indian Governments succeeded in
persuading the Persian authorities to prohibit arms sales by the 1880s
and 1890s, and the firms which carried out the import and export of arms
were warned to stop by the Political Resident. These firms usually
enjoyed the benefits of British protection-for example a
Persian-Armenian firm. A. & T. S. Malcolm, had enjoyed close links
with Gray Paul at Bushire since the latter’s beginnings despite their
role in supplying British arms to the enemy. The illegal nature of this
trade has necessarily precluded its contemporary documentation, but
occasional seizures were reported, including one of 30,000 rifles landed
at Bushire in 1897, for which the local Governor was receiving at 10%
commission.»
According to a Gray Dawes &
Co. notebook already referred to, by the 1880s and 1890s, Gray Paul
also became involved in the forward shipment’s of goods from Bushire to
Teheran. In reply to enquiries from French and German merchants. Gray
Paul outlined their service, for which they charged 5 Kerans (34 Kerans
equalling £1) per load forwarding commission. Donkeys (which could carry
up to 240 lb) were employed to Shiraz, where camels could be hired that
carried two donkey loads. The carriage of 100 maunds (or 7501b) of
cargo would cost about. 200 Kerans from Bushire to Teheran, a journey of
between two and three months› duration.
Gray Paul thus played a
prominent role in the commercial life of Bushire through their work as
B.l. agents, when founded as the headquarters of B. I.’s Gulf service,
the office was run by Robert Paul assisted by two Persian clerks. Simon
Nahiapiet and John Anfet, with thirteen servants. Of the latter, six
were also Persian, one Indo- Portuguese and the remainder British
Indian. British Indians enjoyed an important position among merchants
and traders in the Gulf, acting as shopkeepers, clerks and ‹dubashs› or
foremen of local labour. Their prominence in the early Gulf economy
explains the use of rupees as the ‹official› currency used in
statistical returns» The com• munity of Britons at Bushire in the 1860s
was small: led by Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Pelly, the Political
Resident, it comprised his two assistants, four clerks, an apothecary
and the postmaster. Ten other Britons worked in the telegraph department
and four British military personnel were stationed there. By the end of
the period under review, seven other European firms were established at
Bushire and the British residents now numbered 34. Gray Paul acquired
substantial local property: they owned a large house and garden with
outlying land including stables, another piece of land named Chahar
Sabute, the company’s office and adjoining land, together with a house
and land at Bagh-i-Shiekh Abol» Meanwhile the local population of
Bushire, estimated at 15.000, were crowded into I, 400 densely grouped
houses.
Managing the B.I. service at
Bushire was fraught with problems, as is shown in an analysis of the
arrivals of B.l. steamers at the port between October 1896 and December
1897 compiled by the Political Resident. The steamers then in the trade,
the Kilwa, the Assyna, the Simla, the Pumlia, the Pacnumba, the Pemba,
the Khandalla, the Kapurthala, the Culna, the Chanda and the Patna,
which made 64 calls at the port between them in this period, were on
average at least two days behind their scheduled time of arrival on each
voyage. By supplementing their mail subsidy with the carriage of cargo,
the B. I. steamers caused considerable delays in the collection and
delivery of mails. In the B.I.’s contract, it was stipulated that the
Political Resident at a port was entitled to detail a steamer if
necessary for the preparation of despatches, which further disrupted
attempts to keep to the timetable. Gray Paul. in replying to the
Political Resident’s complaints, admitted that the delays were due to
the time taken in unloading cargoes: the latter suggested that as B.l.
was benefiting from an increase in the cargoes carried. it should allow
more time and provide more vessels to keep the Post Office contract
punctually. The new service of 1904 in effect took up these suggestions,
but this was only a partial solution, as the discharge of goods
suffered principally from the inadequate boat and lighterage
arrangements rather than just an execs.• of cargo. An annual contract
was given to a Persian official known as the Hawal Bashi, whose interest
in personal gain far outweighed any concern for the efficient running
of the Gulf steamer service. Above all, the uncertain, disorganized and
lawless nature of local conditions in Bush ire in the late nineteenth
century made Gray Paul’s job as the B. I. agents a difficult one: in
1898, writing to Mackinnon.
Mackenzie in Calcutta, they
warned that «the town itself is in a most disturbed condition and at any
moment there may be a complete breakdown of (all port) arrangements».
IV
Lingah, where Gray Paul
established an office in 1875, developed and prospered as a
transshipment centre for traffic to and from Bahrain and the ports of
the Trucial coast. The traffic of this port declined considerably after
1902 as a result of the imposition of heavy customs restrictions by the
Persian Government.» In Table 2, the increase in B.l. mail steamers
frequenting this port shows a similar pattern to that of Bushire, as the
vessels called at Lingah as part of the regular service.» However, the
prominence of B.L steamers at Lingah was greater than at the leading
port: the 26.000 tons entered in 1873 represented 85% of total steam
tonnage trading at the port. 16 This importance continued until the
port’s decline after 1902.
As in the case of Bushire,
imports into Lingah heavily exceeded its exports: 42,30,810 compared
with 36,73.490 rupees in 1876. The port’s import trade steadily
increased, often exceeding a crore of rupees (1,00,00,000) in value in
the 1890s. However, unlike Bushire, British goods imported into Lingah
were few and far between. Appendix 3 shows that in 1873 there were none
at all, and only 9,350 rupees worth by 1897. Lingah was thus not
exploited as a market for British goods, B.L and its agents
concentrating on the leading ports of Bushire, Basra and Mohommerah,
with their larger local populations and hinterlands. Of crucial
importance was the availability of transport infrastructure to provide
access: ports with well established caravan routes were most important
to B.L: Bushire had at least two, whereas Lingah had none, its trade
mainly sea-based, involving transshipping goods to other ports.
Lingah’s exports also rose in
value before the crippling customs dues were imposed: from 36.73,490
rupees in 1876 to over a crore of rupees in 1892-4. The traditional
trading areas of Lingah merchants were India and the Arab coast. They
played an important part in the export of pearls from Bahrain, the
import of guns from Muscat and coffee, cloth, flour and rice from India,
and the export of dates to the Arab coast. Only drugs, pearls and
mother of pearl shells were exported to the U.K., which formed less than
I% of the value of Lingah’s exports in 1897-9. Thus Lingah was seen as a
necessary port of call on the mail run rather than of importance for
trade with Britain, although the B.L steamers, in their predominant
position in steam tonnage trading with this port, would have played a
large part in the carriage of goods between Lingah and India.
Gray Paul’s branch manager was
the only British resident at the port. He had also to contend with local
authorities in managing the steamer service – as at Bushire, the
loading and discharge of the steamers was at the mercy of the Hawal
Bashi. The master of the Purnlia, writing to Gray Paul at Bushire in
1897, complained that «I had a day extra at Lingah due to the want of
boats, and had to overcarry 804 packages. The reason of delay appears to
be that the Hawal Bashi would not supply boats, and your representative
(the Gray .Paul branch] complained bitterly of his lack of energy and
co-operation.
VI
The Bander Abbas branch of Gray
Paul was established concurrently with Bushire in 1869. The port was
slowly developing as an exchange centre for goods from a large area of
South-Central Asia, but it declined in the 1890s, when increasing
Russian dominance of central Asian trade severely curtailed the import
of British goods via Bander Abbas. It was a regular port of call of the
B.L steamers where, as in the case of Lingah, B. I. virtually
monopolised local steamer traffic. Appendix 2 shows that in 1885- 6, for
example, when B.L steamers represented 44% of steam tonnage entering
Bushire, the same vessels when calling at Bander Abbas represented over
60% of steamers trading there. In 1897 and 1899 all the steamers
entering were British, and B.I. in particular continued 10 frequent the
port despite the decline in its trade.
This decline is apparent from
an analysis of the value of imports into Bander Abbas, which reached a
peak at nearly a crore of rupees in the early 1890s, from only 17,37,750
rupees in 1873. Valued at 63,41.030 rupees in 1901, it was thus still
an important port of call Exports from Bander Abbas also increased: from
17,65,846 rupees in 1873 to 58,44,560 in 1895, thereafter declining
sharply to only 15,40,126 rupees by 1900. Like Lingah and Bushire, the
balance between imports and exports remained heavily geared to the
former. However, unlike Lingah, a significant proportion of imports into
Bander Abbas were from Britain as this port was also a forwarding
station for goods. Appendix 3 shows that although only 3% by value in
1873, British goods imported rose to 19% of the total in 1898. Exports
to Britain from Bander Abbas remained insignificant throughout the
period under review. The cargoes imported from Britain into this port
were largely cotton piece goods, which were transshipped to many central
Asian cities, until they came under Russian commercial and political
dominance. India was the most important source of imports into Bander
Abbas, supplying indigo, rice, copper, iron and tea. Ex pons from this
port included a small quantity of drugs to Britain, and dates, dried
fruit and nuts to India.
With the port of Bushire,
Bander Abbas acted as an outlet for the Persian opium crop. B.L vessels,
in competition with the Bombay and Persian Steam Navigation Company,
shipped approximately one third of opium exports from this port, from
whence a quarter of the total opium output from the Gulf was exported.
B.I. steamers entered the Bander Abbas opium trade in 1885, later than
at Bushire, carrying 2.4() chests to London, although Hong Kong was
usually the most profitable destination. In 1892 the carriage of opium
by B.l. vessels reached a peak in this period: 2,194 chests from Bushire
and 746 from Bander Abbas. This port. as was generally the case, lacked
a local manufacturing industry or a skilled labour force, so opium was
seen as a useful export commodity.
With its substantial imports of
British goods, Bander Abbas was an important branch to Gray Paul who
were the only European firm represented at the port- In 1908 it was
observed that «except for Great Britain, no foreign power possesses any
tangible interest here», although significantly a Russian consul was
based there.» By the end of the period under review, the import and
export business of Bander Abbas was being transferred to Bushire, as the
main place of transshipment of imports from Britain to the Persian
coast of the Gulf. The considerable trade in importing rifles at Bander
Abbas was, meanwhile, stopped effectively by the local customs
authorities. Despite this, the port remained a regular, rather than
optional port of call, and B. I. established their own loading and
discharge arrangements here by maintaining their own fleet of boats.
VI
Bahrain, where Gray Paul opened
an office in 1883, was their only branch on the Arab side of the Gulf
in this period. Agriculturally and commercially the most valuable
district on this coast, a direct service by B.l. to Bahrain became
especially important after the decline of Lingah.» Appendix 2 shows that
it was not a regular port of call to the same extent as Bushire, Lingah
and Bander Abbas, but the tonnage of steamers entering Bahrain
increased significantly from 9,600 tons in 1874 to 41,349 tons by 1885.
B. I.’s dominance of the mail steamer traffic at Bahrain was almost
complete: in 1884, for example, the only other steamer entering the port
was a coaster of 270 tons. The steamer trade of this port fluctuated
more dramatically than at other Gray Paul branches, as would be expected
at an optional port of call, and was more dependent on local trading
conditions. However, by I 904, the tonnage of British steamers entering
Bahrain exceeded that of Lingah.
The value of goods imported
into Bahrain increased consistently from 32,87.275 rupees in 1873 to 1
1/2 crores by the early 1900s. Yet, like Lingah, it was not developed as
a market for British goods: Appendix 3 shows that only 5% of Bahrain’s
imports of 1897 were from the UK, and these were principally firearms.
Exports from Bahrain, which increased in proportion to its imports, were
mainly to India, accounting for 72% in 1899 (68% of Bahrain’s imports
were from India). As such, B.I. vessels carried a large proportion of
these cargoes, which were principally coffee dates, rice – and pearls.
The pearl fishery at Bahrain
was the most important activity at the port, exceeded in value only by
that of Oman, 4,500 boats, manned by 74,000 men, were employed there by
the end of the nineteenth century. More than half of these vessels
(2,593) were operated under direct British protection, so Gray Paul, the
only British mercantile firm with a branch at Bahrain, were closely
involved in the trade, and carried a large proportion of the pearl
exports to India and other Gulf ports. Pearls were one of the few
sources of wealth on the Arabian side of the Gulf, and dominated
Bahrain’s economy. In 1866, pearl exports were valued at £400,000; by
1905-6 the trade was worth nearly £1 1/2 million» For this reason,
unlike other Gulf ports, the value of Bahrain’s exports kept pace with
that of its imports in this period. Edward Hopkins, who was sent out as
an assistant at Gray Paul’s Bahrain office in 1912, described the trade
thus: » Pearls, the main export, were big business … in the season
Bahrain wok on a new aspect, and for a few weeks our little group was
enhanced by a couple of dealers from Hatton Gardens, entertaining men of
the world, full of the latest from London». Gray Paul arranged with
another European firm, Maller & Co. , to market the pearls overseas,
providing them with a 3 1/2 % commission covering risks or loss and
theft. White rather than yellow pearls were most favoured, and valued at
£1 per grain, four grains equalling one carat.
As Hopkins suggests, other than
the pearl fishery, Bahrain was still a quiet, remote port in this
period. By the time of Hopkins› arrival, a second European firm had
established a branch at Bahrain: Roberr Wonckhaus, the agents for the
Hamburg America Line. By the 1900s, this firm was becoming a strong
competitor, especially at the head of the Gulf, but B.I. provided the
only regular service: «the mail ship called once a fortnight on the way
up, and on the alternate weeks on the way down. Thus we received English
mail only once every two weeks, and our newspapers were always four
weeks or more old.» The European community numbered only four: Hopkins,
Mac-pherson (the junior partner at Gray Paul and the branch manager),
the Political Resident, and Holst of Robert Wonckhaus. They lacked «any
cable, telephone, electric light, motor cars, a cinema, a club, a bar
and plumbing». Although very busy in the pearl season, Gray Paul’s
branch at Bahrain was practically closed down for at least six months of
the year and often enlivened only by the occasional visits of B.l.
masters and «the men-of-war on the Gulf anti-gunrunning and anti-slavery
patrol». Hopkins, who complained that «the mails being so far apart,
office work tended to be concentrated around midday, leaving little to
do in the intervals», found himself transferred to the more important
branch at Basra.»
VII
Basra, the terminus of the B.l.
service, was the second most important town in Mesopotamia after
Baghdad. In decline in the second half of the nineteenth century, it
regained importance with the stimulus of the river steamer service on
the Tigris and Euphrates and B.l. shipping in the Gulf.» As the port of
Basra did not come under the scrutiny of the British Resident at
Bushire, no comparable body of statistics as used in, Appendices 2 and 3
is available. A short series from 1894 to 1903, however, shows that in
terms of entrances and clearances of steamers, Basra was one of the most
important Gulf ports. Separate figures for mail steamers entering Basra
have not been discovered, but British steam tonnage dominated the trade
to the extent of over 85%. As each B.l. vessel would have called here
as a matter of course, it is likely it retained a position of
superiority comparable with other ports of call.
Statistics of Basra’s import
and export trade are given in £sterling, and with an approximate
exchange rate of 15 rupees to the£,» it is clear that Basra’s trade was
among the most important of the Gulf ports in value. In 1895, for
example, imports into Basra were valued at £1,399,465 and ex pons at
£1,090,734. Bush ire’s totals for the same year were 1,83,04,490 rupees
(approx. £1 1;\m) and 95 ,18,880 rupees (approx. £600,000). In 1900 the
value of exports from Basra, which for the period 1893- 1904 remained
similar to the value of imports, exceeded £1 1/2 million in value.
Recent research has shown that as in the case of Bushire, the U.K.
replaced India as the main source of trade of Basra. In 1901 -4, over £1
1/2 millions worth of goods were imported into Iraq as a whole from
Europe and North America, principally comprising cotton goods and
general cargoes. Seaborne ex pons from Iraq tripled in quantity between
1880-4 and 1910-3: these included wool and cereals brought to Basra by
the Lynch steamers for onward shipment by B.L and dates, liquorice root
and horses.»
The date trade from Basra in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was of particular
importance to Gray Mackenzie. They arranged the loading of B.l. ships
with dates on their own account and for other European and local firms,
on consignment for Gray, Dawes & Company of London and several
merchants in America and Australia. For example, in 1892 shipments of
dates on Gray Mackenzie’s own account represented over 10% of the total
export of this commodity from Basra – 65,000 1/2 cwt. boxes out of a
total of 550,000. However, Gray Mackenzie’s main business was in
shipping dates for others. A typical shipment was an 1890 example of
22,791 boxes of Mullawee dates (the finest quality type) at cost per
invoice of £5,686. Packing charges amounted to £2,206, insurance at I % –
and freight per invoice of £1,227, with an extra £455 for
transshipment. Gray Mackenzie’s 10% commission totalled £966, on the
final bill to the American merchant customer of £10,628. The vessels
carrying the date export from Basra were mainly B.I. ships, so it is
clear that Gray Mackenzie played a prominent part in this trade. Other
firms involved were Lynch Brothers, the Persian Gulf Transport Company
and the German firm Hotz and Co., together with several local merchant
houses. As in Bushire, Gray Mackenzie dealt with Indian and Arab
merchants rather than the actual producers of the commodities they
handled. A letter of 1891 discussed the possibility of arranging with
«native packers for the purchase of their dates on the spot, exercising a
supervision over their packing», but complained that the date packers
would not accept under 10% profit- based on the price of dates in London
– and it was impossible to keep an adequate check on quality control.
Basra was regarded as «almost a
metropolis» in comparison with Bahrain and the smaller Gulf ports,
according to Hopkins. British interests predominated over those of other
European countries at the port: 27 British residents lived there,
mainly connected with the two British firms, Lynch’s and Gray Mackenzie.
The latter owned extensive property at the port, including the first
water closet in Mesopotamia and the land and buildings of the Basra
Club. Hopkins, assigned to looking after the loading and discharging of
B. I. vessels and ships of other companies for whom Gray Mackenzie acted
as agents, described how Basra «was unlike most ports in that it
completely lacked most of the facilities associated with such places.
There were no docks or wharves, no warehouses or cranes, no tugs or
dredgers, no buoys, lights or other aids to navigation, and neither
harbour master nor port charges». Problems in managing the service
included the fact that «owing to the lack of any telegraphic line from
down river, ships usually arrived more or less unexpectedly». The port
was especially busy during the date season, when as many as four or five
steamers at once were loading dates for Britain, the U.S.A. and
Australia. Gray Mackenzie owned four steel barges, but these were not
sufficient for all the loading and discharge work: the remainder was
done by local craft, known as mahalas that «were poled, rowed, sailed or
drifted between ship and shore».» When timetables were being drawn up
for the new Gulf service, Gray Mackenzie staff wrote to Mackinnon,
Mackenzie in Bombay that although it was possible to load and discharge
vessels at Basra in three days when business was slack, this was not the
case in the date and horse seasons. All steamers were detained 24 hours
in any case due to quarantine regulations. Basra particularly suffered
the effects of the lawlessness and robbery prevalent at the Gulf: for
example, in 1912 Gray Mackenzie wrote 10 the British Consul at Basra
complaining of the theft of ten bags of coffee, I bag of sugar and one
case of tea from the Barala, adding »we would take this opportunity of
drawing your attention to the insecure state of the river». Rarely were
the culprits tracked down or punished. When pirates raided a Strick,
Scott and Company lighter, stealing two bags of sugar and exchanging
shots with the watchmen, the agents complained that «this is another
instance to show the utter helplessness of the Turkish Government to
protect British property».» Hopkins had described Basra as «a hopelessly
inefficient port», so that it seems surprising such a high value of
trade was achieved there.
VIII
Finally, Gray Mackenzie also
represented B.J. steamers at Mohommerah, which was to become the most
important of the Gulfs pons after the First World War. Mohommerah, as
well as Basra, benefitted considerably from the opening of the Karun
river to steamers in I 888, after which it transshipped cargoes to many
central Persian cities such as Ahwaz and Isfahan. No record of British
steamers entering Mohommerah survives. It was an optional port of call
for the B. J. from 1884, and enjoyed a regular weekly service from 1894.
The value of imports into Mohommerah and the Karun pons rose from
£125.115 in 1894 to £263.902 in 1904, with a peak in this period of
£340,764 in 1900. The value of the exports from this port rose from
£28,251 in 1894 to £79.405 by 1904, reaching £151,725 in 1901. During
the first six months of 1902. according to a return kept by Gray
Mackenzie, B.l. steamers carried 326\4 tons of local cargo and 97 3/4
tons of transshipped cargo from Mohommerah, suggesting that this was
only occasionally a steamer port: it was, in fact, the main haven for
the long distance how fleet of the Gulf.». Although its trade in this
period represented only a fraction of that of the nearby port of Basra,
it too took an increasing interest in trading with Britain. In 1894,
only 14% of Mohommerah’s exports were shipped to Britain, and only
<1% of its imports were derived from there. By 1899, as seen in
Appendix S, 37% of Mohommcrah ‹s imports and 19% of its exports were
through its trade with the U.K. imports by this date were mainly cotton
goods from Britain and coffee, rice, silk and sugar in addition to more
cotton goods from India. Exports from this area, which was regarded as
of great agricultural and commercial potential.» included wheat, dates,
oilseeds and wool sent to Britain, and dates, horses, ghee, wool and
specie to India. The production of gum from Shiraz and Isfahan was
calculated as worth £40,000 by 1904, and regarded as capable of further
expansion.»
The two firms of Gray Mackenzie
and Lynch Brothers dominated the foreign trade of Mohommerah, which as
the capital and only important town of Southern Arabistan, had a British
consular office.
The expansion in the trade of
the Karun district, through its connections with the B.l. service via
Mohommerah resulted in a three-fold increase in the population of the
latter, and an improvement in the standard of living of its inhabitants.
The local labour employed by shippers started their own small holdings
and purchased donkeys, ploughs and seeds.
The opening of the Karun was
primarily seen in terms of its benefit to the commercial prosperity of
Britain and British India. As Curzon pointed out, the inhabitants of
«Central Persia, as far north as Isfahan, already derive the bulk of
their luxuries, and almost the whole of their clothing, from Manchester
or Bombay; and each fresh town, we may say each new village, that is
brought into communication with the Persian Gulf, will thereby be drawn
into the mesh of the Lancashire cotton spinner or the Hindu artisan.
Britain’s interest in trading
ventures such as the opening of the Karun to navigation was also seen in
the building of the Baghdad railway. Lord lnchcape, then chairman of
B.l., played an important part in the negotiations between the Board of
the Baghdad Railway Company and the Ottoman River Navigation Company by
which Turkey and Germany recognised Britain’s position in the Gulf.
lnchcape’s insistence that the Baghdad-Kuwait stretch of the railway
should be kept under British control led to the establishment of a
protectorate over Kuwait in 1914.
IX
When a contemporary observer
maintained that the mail steamers of B. I. «literally created the trade
of the Persian Gulf›,» this was no hollow boast. In the context of the
services of B.L as a whole, however, the Gulf run was in its infancy and
its trade not yet on a large scale. For example, British goods imported
into the Gulf were valued at nearly £2 1/2 million in 1901 – 2 whilst
British goods imported into India exceeded £32 million in 1899- 1900 and
£42 million in 1904-5-» The subsidy received by the B.l. for its mail
service was not large: in 1904, less than £30,000 was received for
providing two services employing up to eight costly, well appointed
steamers. Profits earned from freight and passengers were not
substantial: between July 1901 and July 1902 traffic from Karachi to the
Gulf was worth less than £15.000 in earnings to B.l.» The tonnage of
cargoes for export was not substantial: from January to August 1902 only
10,703 tons was shipped by B.L steamers from Mohommerah, Basra and
Baghdad. Although the Gulf service was not the most important of the
activities of B.l. ,B.l. was of the greatest significance to the
economic life of the Gulf. Before 1862, only a small British naval
presence existed in the Gulf, following the Treaty of 1820 and
especially the Anglo-Persian war of 1857. By 1914, B. I. and its
shipping agents had created the necessary infrastructure for British
commercial development in this region, providing a stepping stone for
future expansion during the exploitation of the Gulfs oil resources. In
the mid-nineteenth century, small local sailing vessels traded from the
Gulf within the Indian Ocean, to East Africa, Aden and India. By the
early twentieth century, the steamers of B. I. had brought the ports of
the Gulf into a much wider commercial network and successfully found yet
another outlet for the products of Britain’s expanding industrial
power.
Jnchcape pte,
London
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